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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This case is before the Court of Appeals with a companion case, State of 
Utah v. Joseph Madsen, 2001091-CA. Both Defendants have argued that they 
were prejudiced at trial by the show of excessive security, that the trial court 
wrongly denied a Motion for Mistrial for reference to the facts both Defendants 
were in punitive isolation and on lockdown status, and that they were wrongly 
denied a pre-sentence report. Appellant Fernandez solely argues for reversal on 
the basis that the trial court wrongly refused to excuse a juror for cause forcing the 
use of a peremptory challenge. 
ARGUMENTS 
I 
FERNANDEZ'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL WAS VIOLATED 
BY EXCESSIVE COURTROOM SECURITY. 
The State does not refute the standards set forth in State v. Gardner, 789 P 2 
d 273, 281, Cert Denied 494, US 1090 (1990) requiring that the "least intrusive 
methods available." be used is providing courtroom security. Rather it argues that 
since the jurors did not (or likely did not) see the shackles, and since the jurors 
knew that the Defendant's were jailed "mischief makers" that there was no 
prejudice. Although the State correctly concedes that a Defendant being tried in 
shackles or with other indicia of his inmate status has the potential to jeopardize a 
fair trial, Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 US 560, 567 (1986), and that they are either to 
have their guilt or innocence determined solely on the evidence introduces at trial, 
Taylor v. Kennedy, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978), it misapplies those standards to the 
present fact situation. The presence of a uniformed officer seated behind 
Defendant's courtroom, in the presence of the jurors likewise violated the above 
standards. 
The State's argument that extra security behind Defendant Gardner justifies 
or excuses extra security behind Defendants in this case is not valid. Gardner was 
on trial for homicide that occurred in the context of a court appearance, a fact that 
certainly was known to the jurors in his case. He did not appear before them in the 
context of potential "mischief maker". In the instant case, armed security certainly 
added extra concern or raised additional questions in the jurors minds creating 
circumstances influencing their determination of guilt or innocence. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING A MOTION FOR 
MISTRIAL. 
It is hard to comprehend how it can be argued that the violation of a Order 
in Limine not to introduce evidence of the Defendant's "lock-down" status is not 
fatally prejudiced to Defendant's right to a fair trial. Despite such an Order (TR-
14-5), the State's witness Troy Butler testified both Defendant's were in punitive 
isolation lockdown cells at the time of the incident (TR-171). Indeed, the trial 
court itself, in ruling on Motions for a mistrial determined that reference to be 
"additional prejudice." (TR-182). 
The State does not seem to concede the prejudicial nature of Officer 
Butler's testimony. Rather it argues that its admission did not "so likely influence 
the jury that the Defendant cannot be said to have had a fair trial." State v. 
Robertson, 932 P2d 1219, 1231 (Utah 1997). It then goes on citing a list of bad 
things the jurors already knew about Defendant's, arguing the abundance of 
properly admitted prejudicial evidence limited the effect of the knowledge of the 
Defendant's punitive violations. 
However, the State does not consider the cumulative effect of this 
prejudicial information with the inferences raised by the excessive courtroom 
security noted in the previous argument. This court should not consider the 
totality of all of prejudicial facts against Defendant legitimately known by the 
jurors to excuse the misconduct of the States witness while ignoring the 
cumulative effect of the prejudicial facts improperly known. It is the totality of 
the excessive courtroom security and the prejudicial testimony the Defendant 
argues denied his right to a fair trial. Robertson, id. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should find that the cumulative effect of improper, prejudicial 
conduct and testimony presented to the jurors denied Defendant his right to a fair 
trial and reverse his conviction. 
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